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WOODFIN L. BUTTE*

The Law of the Sea - Breakers Ahead
He had bought a large map representing the sea,
Without the least vestige of land:
And the crew were much pleased when they found it to be
A map they could all understand.
-Lewis Carroll,
The Hunting of the Snark

In December, 1970, the General Assembly of the United Nations
adopted a Resolution calling a Conference charged essentially with
rewriting the Law of the Sea for some time in 1973.1 The Resolution
provided for two preparatory meetings of the Assembly's "Committee on
Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of
National Jurisdiction" to be held in 1971, and reserved for itself the right
to postpone the Conference if after those two meetings such postponement
seemed necessary or wise. On the basis of results so far, postponement
seems the only safe answer; a decision may have been taken by the time
these words see the light of day.
But the story is longer than that and needs to be told in more detail in
one place.
The Conference of the Law of the Sea held in Geneva in 1958 had
produced four Conventions of which the world community felt reasonably
proud at the time: 2 The Convention of the High Seas, 3 the Convention on
Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, 4 the
*Professor of Law at The University of Texas at Austin. From 1940 to 1964 Professor
Butte was a lawyer and executive with Standard Oil Company (N.J.).
1
Resolution 2750 (XXV) C, 17 December 1970. U.N. Monthly Chronicle, January 1971
at p. 37; International Legal Materials 224 (Jan. 1971).
2
Dean, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, 52 AJIL 607; Whiteman,
Conference on the Law of the Sea: Convention on the Continental Shelf, 52 AJIL 629. Both
articles are reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, ASIL, 1969.

There is, of course, an extensive body of literature on the 1958 Conventions which the reader
can readily consult.
3
April 29, 1958. 13 U.S.T. 2312; T.I.A.S. 5200; 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
4
April 29, 1958. 17 U.S.T. 138; T.I.A.S. 5969; 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
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Convention of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 5 and the Con6
vention on the Continental Shelf.
Adoption of these four Conventions, which remain open for accession
by any state, left the world with a feeling that the law of the sea was in
pretty good shape. There were a few holes; but it was not until the
mid-1960s that people began to feel that what had been decided in 1958
should be reexamined and modified or completed.
Of the few major insufficiencies in the Conventions, one had been
recognized for a long time: the failure to reach any agreement on the
breadth of the territorial sea. It can be cogently argued that Article 24 of
the Convention on the High Seas, which defines the "Contiguous Zone" as
"a zone of the high seas contiguous to the territorial sea," and says that it
"may not extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline," manifests a clear
understanding that "territorial sea" will end, and "high sea" will begin,
somewhere short of twelve miles. But it is true that the line has not been in
fact drawn at any fixed distance. The failure of agreement on a uniform
breadth was deplored, but was not regarded in 1958 as of make-or-break
importance.
The second major insufficiency in the post-1958 law of the sea was the
lack of any clear and certain way for coastal states to assure protection and
conservation of offshore fishery resources outside traditional "territorial
waters." On the one hand, these coastal states, many of them without yet
having the technology or capital fully to exploit these resources, see in
them a factor vital to their future development. On the other, the technology of distant-water commercial fishing has advanced so rapidly in the
past twenty-five years that these states have had to sit and see "their" vital
resource gobbled up, with total disregard of rational conservation for
maximum sustained yield, by floating factory fleets from thousands of miles
away, flying the flags of states not parties to the 1958 Convention on
Fisheries.
As a result, coastal states have resorted to unilateral declarations of
extension of their "control" or "sovereignty" or "territorial sea," far
enough out to bring the particular fisheries under their wing. This situation
is most acute in Latin America, where at least nine states have announced

extension of their control to a distance of two hundred miles, and the
number is growing.
These extreme extensions have been vigorously protested in diplomatic
correspondence, but quietly accepted in practice. In the world of seventy
5
April
6

29, 1958. 15 U.S.T. 1606; T.I.A.S. 5639; 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
April 29, 1958. 15 U.S.T. 471; T.I.A.S. 5578; 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
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years ago, for a foreign power to arrest United States fishing vessels a

hundred and fifty miles at sea would have been regarded as an act of war,
or as piracy, and would have brought immediate naval protection for the
legitimate fishing activities of those vessels in accord with international
law. Today, the vessels are permitted to be taken into the foreign power's

ports under arrest, and forced to pay a fine and obtain a "license"; and the
State Department, under authority from Congress, then quietly reimburses
the owners the amount of the fine! So far have we come from "millions for
7
defense; not one cent for tribute!"
The third, and it now appears the most serious, insufficiency of the 1958
Conventions was introduced into the Continental Shelf Convention by way
of a modification of President Truman's 600-foot depth limit for the Continental Shelf. Basing itself on language drafted and approved by a meeting
of the American States in Ciudad Trujillo in 1956, and later adopted by the
International Law Commission, 8 the 1958 Geneva Conference agreed to
add to the "adjacent to" and the "depth of 200 metres" tests the words

"or, beyond that limit [i.e., 200 metres depth], to where the depth of the
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the
said areas."
As to this ambiguity it is generally accepted that the "adjacency" test is
overriding as indicating a maximum breadth of the legal "shelf "; nobody
could have meant the "exploitability" tests to let technological devel-

opments in the United States, Britain and France carry their "national
jurisdictions" out to the median line of the Atlantic Ocean.
The "Common Heritage of Mankind" as Catalyst

It was at about this juncture that Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta
almost single-handedly nudged and prodded the General Assembly into
taking action. This consisted, essentially, of creation of a 42-state "Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond
7

Act of August 27, 1954, 68 Stat. 883, 22 U.S.C. secs. 1971 et seq.
The United States, in a sense, accepted the principle of coastal control of offshore
fisheries beyond territorial waters in 1966, when Congress established ". . . a fisheries zone
contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States. The United States will exercise the same
exclusive rights in respect to fisheries in the zone as it has in its territorial sea, subject to the
continuation of traditional fishing by foreign states within this zone as may be recognized by
the United States." P.L. 89. 658, Oct. 14, 1966, 80 Stat. 908, 16 USCA secs. 1081.4.
The exclusive fishing zone so claimed by the United States is defined as extending only
nine miles from the outer limit of the territorial sea. But once we have accepted, and in fact
aided to establish, the principle, our freedom to object to similar action taken by other states is
considerably circumscribed; as the old smoking-car story had it, we're not discussing the
principle but simply haggling over the price.
8
Finlay, The Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf, 64 AJIL 42 (Jan. 1970). See also
Henkin, A Reply to Mr. Finlay, 64 AHIL 62.
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the Limits of National Jurisdiction," 9 and a year later a request for an
expression of views of members as to convening a Conference on the Law
of the Sea, and a declaration of a moratorium on seabed activity. 10
The ambiguities surrounding the determination of the outer limits of the
continental shelf, Ambassador Pardo reasoned, are so difficult to cure by
agreement that if we hold up establishment of an international r6gime on
the deep-seabed until the dividing line is clearly drawn, we may well find
ourselves confronted with claims staked out on the deep-seabed by technologically advanced states which will effectively destroy the possibility of
reaching our "common heritage of mankind" goal.
Nevertheless, there must be some limit beyond which national claims
will not go; and if we can express this concept in neutral language ("beyond the limits of national jurisdiction"), we can arrive by elimination at a
fuzzy-edged but still vast area to which an international r6gime can be
applied."
Adopting this reasoning, on December 17, 1970, the General Assembly
by a vote of 108-0 adopted Resolution 2749 (XXV). 1 2 This Resolution,
...Affirming

that there is an area of the seabed and the ocean floor, and the

subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, the precise limits of
which are yet to be determined,
...Solemnly

declares that:

1. The seabed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the area), as well as the
resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind.
7. The exploration of the area and the exploitation of its resources shall be
carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of States, whether land-locked or coastal, and taking into
particular consideration the interests and needs of the developing countries..
On the same day, December 17, 1970, the General Assembly went on
to adopt Resolution 2750 (XXV), A, B, and C.13 This Resolution contains
what is, so far as the author has found, the first reference to broadening the
effort from "peaceful uses of the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits
9
Resolution 2467A (XXIII), Dec. 21, 1968, U.N. Doc. A/Res./2467 (XXIII), Jan. 14,
1969, VIII I.L.M. 201.
10
Resolution 2574D (XXIV), Dec. 15, 1969; U.N. Doc. A/Res./2574 (XXIV), 15 Jan.
1970; IX I.L.M. 419. The United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and 25 other
states (including Malta!) voted against the moratorium, and the State Department has pointed
out that, as a General Assembly Resolution, it is recommendatory only and not binding.
"Paper delivered at a regional meeting of the ASIL at The University of Texas at
Austin,
March 14, 1969; published in 5 TEX. INT'L L.F. 204.
2
1 U.N. Press Release GA/4355; X I.L.M. 220 (January 197 1).
13
Resolution 2750 (XXV) 17 December 1970; X I.L.M. 224 (January 197 1).
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of national jurisdiction," as the Committee's title states it, to include "the
general framework of the law of the sea."
The U.N. Monthly Chronicle, January, 1971, pp. 40-42, reports on the
discussion in the Assembly's First Committee, and makes it plain that this
enlargement was understood and intended. It was, in this writer's view, the
death-knell of hopes for an agreement on the original purpose: to establish
the deep-seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction as "the common
heritage of mankind" and construct a r6gime to administer it.
Part C, reflecting this decision,
Decided to convene in 1973, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
3 hereof, a Conference on the Law of the Sea which would deal with the
establishment of an equitable international regime-including an international
machinery-for the area and the resources of the seabed and the ocean floor
and the subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, a precise
definition of the area, and a broad range of related issues including those
concerning the regime of the high seas, the continental shelf, the territorial
sea (including the question of its breadth and the question of international
straits) and contiguous zones, fishing and conservation of the living resources
of the high seas (including the question of the preferential rights of the coastal
States), the preservation of the marine environment (including, inter alia, the
prevention of pollution) and scientific research;...
Part C goes on to add 44 new members to the Committee (for a total of
86 states) and
6. Instructs the enlarged Committee to hold two meetings in Geneva in
March and July-August 1971 in order to prepare for the Conference draft
treaty articles embodying the international regime, including an international
machinery for the area and the resources of the seabed and the ocean floor
and the subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction taking into
account the equitable sharing by all States in the benefits to be derived
therefrom, bearing in mind the special interests and needs of developing
countries, whether coastal or landlocked, on the bases of the Declaration of
Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 1970, and a comprehensive list of subjects and issues
relating to the law of the sea referred to in paragraph 2 above which would be
dealt with by the Conference and draft articles on such subjects and issues...
...

Tackling the Job -and

Foundering

Surely no drafting committee was ever given such a mandate. In fact,
about the only realistic note in the whole Resolution is the provision that
"... if the General Assembly as its twenty-seventh session determines the
progress of the preparatory work of the Committee to be insufficient, it
may decide to postpone the Conference... "
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 6, No. 2
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The United States had expressed itself 1 4 as being in favor of a series of
conferences, at the first of which lroblems which have been thought about
and studied for a long time might be ready for decision-e.g., breadth of
the territorial sea and the continental shelf-with newer problems to which
more study needs to be given and as to which we still need more knowledge-e.g., deep-sea mining, pollution-left for further conferences
as they in turn are ready to be settled. However, in view of the overwhelming desire of most states to "reconsider the law of the sea as a
whole," the United States supported the Resolution. The present writer
thinks that the original position expressed by the United States was right,
and he questions the wisdom of our having receded from it to go along with
the majority.
Reading the Resolution and viewing the task of the enlarged and hence
even more unwieldy Committee from any angle, reading the statements
that have been made and the positions that have been taken, it would need
a more confirmed optimist than this writer even to imagine that any seriously supportable proposals could be worked out, agreed by the Committee and recommended to an international Conference in 1973.
The history of the two meetings in Geneva in 1971 does little to dissipate this writer's gloom over the prospect. The first meeting, in March,
almost didn't meet at all; two weeks of work in New York were required to
arrive at enough of an agreed agenda for Committee members to be
prepared to go to Geneva to sit down and talk about it. When the Committee did meet, almost its entire time was spent listening to Statements of
Position by national delegates, mostly those with a grievance.
These statements commonly run to half an hour or more. They begin by
praising the General Assembly and emphasizing the need for constructive
statesmanship on the part of delegates to solve these vital problems; they
end by noting the minimum position of the state whose delegate is speaking, which position is of course not subject to negotiation, or to being
overridden by outworn rules out of another century, imposed on the world
by imperialistic powers anxious to retain their dominating position.
Some constructive work was done on listing the issues which will eventually have to be decided; but the general sound was discouragingly like
that of the polarization which so dismayed all who followed the two
ill-fated UNCTAD meetings of the mid-sixties. A great quantity of probably unproductive effort was spent on the organization of the Conference,
14position Paper presented by the United States to the Secretary-General on June 12,
1970, reproduced at IX I.L.M. 833.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 6, No. 2
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and on the allocation of topics for study and drafting to the Main Committee and to each of its three SubCommittees.
The International Seabed Regime
Even before this meeting-in fact, even before the General Assembly's
Resolution of December 17, 1970, calling for a Conference -a good deal of
work had been and was being done at the national and regional level.' 5 The

United States, for one, had been far from idle, officially and unofficially.
Congress, individual Senators, Federal Government departments, States,
Bar Associations, official and unofficial industry bodies, universities, foundation think-tanks, all were busy holding meetings, consulting, grinding out
reports and drafts. From all this welter of activity emerged one draft which

is difficult to trace to any of the others, but which based as it is on a
Presidential statement of policy' 6 superseded all of them.

This draft is the "Draft United Nations Convention on the International
Seabed Area," subtitled "Working Paper," which was submitted by the
United States to the U.N. Committee on August 3, 1970.1 7 It was prepared

under a considerable head of steam by an interdepartmental committee in
Washington, largely under the leadership of State Department lawyers of
outstanding competence. Its introductory statement clearly describes it as

a "working paper for discussion purposes," and says that it does "not
5

1 0n May 8, 1970, nine Latin American states had signed "The Montevideo Declaration
on Law of the Sea," in which they started their own claims to a 200-marine mile territorial
sea, and declared "the right [of littoral states] ... to delimit this maritime sovereignty and
jurisdiction in conformity with their own geological characteristics ...[including] ...the right
to explore, conserve and exploit the living resources of the sea adjacent to their territories ...[and] ...the natural resources of the seabed and of the subsoil of the ocean floor
out to where the littoral state claims jurisdiction over the sea..." IX I.L.M. 1081.
On August 8, 1970, Latin American States meeting in Lima had adopted Resolutions, in
response to the Secretary-General's request for an expression of views, declaring their
common opinion that the law of the sea should be the subject of a new and comprehensive
Conference, together with their general views on various problems to be discussed at the
Conference. Their statement as to the right of each State to draw its own limits is similar to
that in the Montevideo Declaration, and was adopted by the affirmative vote of fourteen
States. U.N. Doc. A/AC 138/28, August 14, 1970. X I.L.M. 207.
See in this connection, F.V. Garcia-Amador, Latin America and the Law of the Sea,

prepared for the 1970 CONFERENCE

OF THE LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE

of the University of

Rhode Island, scheduled for publication by that Institute toward the end of 1971.
On September 8- 10, 1970, the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of
Non-Aligned Countries met in Lusaka. Fifty-three states were present; twelve more attended
as observers. This Conference adopted a broad, well-drafted "Statement on the Seabed,"
endorsing the "common heritage of mankind" concept, and supporting the convening at an
early date of a Conference on the Law of the Sea: "these questions should be dealt with
together in a comprehensive manner rather than piecemeal," NAC/Conf. 3/Res. 11; U.N.
Note Verbale NV/209, November 12, 1970; X I.L.M. 218.
16
May 23, 1970; 64 AJIL 930; IX i.L.M. 806; U.N. Doc. A/AC 138/22.
171X I.L.M. 1046- 1080.
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neccessarily represent the definitive views of the United States Government."
The U.S. Working Paper has nevertheless been widely accepted as the
U.S. Proposal to the Committee, and U.S. representatives have defended
its basic conceptions as though this were the case. It has been critically
analyzed by two British scholars, 18 and has come under heavy fire from a
variety of sources, United States and foreign. It need not be reviewed here
except very briefly. It proposes, essentially, a 12-mile territorial sea, with
protection for navigation and overflight of international straits; 19 and that
the seabed be divided into three zones: (1) a "national" zone, to end at the
200 meter isobath (or the 12 mile territorial sea limit, whichever is broader); (2) a "trusteeship" zone, administered by the coastal state, with revenue to be shared between the coastal state and the International Seabed
Resources Authority, to extend from the end of the "national" zone to a
line to be drawn where the angle of decline of the continental slope reaches
a certain number of degrees, this number to be agreed; and (3) the deep
seabed itself, to be administered by the International Seabed Resources
Authority. This Authority is provided for in great detail, and in general
follows the structure of the United Nations itself in all its beauty and
complexity.
We have, so far as this writer is aware, had no encouragement from any
state which, like ourselves, is relatively well endowed with continental
shelf, suggesting support for our proposed renunciation of everything beyond the 200 meter isobath. The harder we push this proposal, the more
likely we are to be stuck with it even if we get nothing for it.
Coastal Protection of Offshore Fisheries
In our effort to substitute a new international agreement on fisheries,
giving the coastal states greater control, for the present confused and
deteriorating atmosphere of exaggerated claims by individual states, all
preliminary signs are that we have also failed. Unilateral extension of one's
territorial sea to any desired limit is so simple, so unambiguous and so
all-inclusive-in short, so unilateral-that in the absence of pressure
18
Auburn, The International Seabed Area, 20 INT'L. & COMp. L.Q. 173 (April 1971) and
Jennings, The U.S. Draft Treaty on the International Seabed Area-Basic Principles, 20
INT'L. & COMp. L.Q. 433 (July 197 1). Mr. Auburn raises a wealth of unanswered questions of
detail; Mr. Jennings poses some fundamental problems as to the general applicability of such a
treaty, especially to states which are not parties to it.
19 For a vivid statement of the importance the United States attached in 1958 and
presumably still would attach to changing the three-mile limit to twelve, see Dean, supra note
2.
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they have not yet felt the 200-milers see no reason to give it up. One drafts
and publishes a decree and, presto!, one has sovereignty, absolute control,
over the seabed and the subsoil, the water and the fish, and the airspace
above, to whatever breadth one designates and nobody to divide it with.
Best of all, one does not have to negotiate and compromise and get the
agreement of one's rivals to the terms of an international treaty.
True, a few states will write stiff diplomatic notes refusing to recognize
the claim, but (as a Peruvian lawyer once said to me at this point of the
discussion) "just wait fifty years!" And it has already been twenty-five.
The United States has been negotiating with Peru and Chile in Buenos
Aires for some years, with no visible result, except that the number of
states claiming a 200-mile territorial sea seems to have grown from three to
at least nine.20 The United States Congress, in an awkward shotgun approach, has held up renewal of our participation in the World Coffee
Agreement, to put pressure on Brazil to stop arresting our fishing boats on
the high seas. This has produced the usual charges of "economic agression," but no sign of Brazil's backing down; and the United States apparently continues to abide by the Coffee Agreement on the assumption that it
will ultimately be renewed retroactively to the date of its expiration.
Pollution of the Sea
All of the general statements regarding the law of the sea, the calling of
the Conference to deal with it, and the enumeration of subjects that must
be dealt with, include vigorous condemnation of "pollution" and forthright
statements of the need to prohibit and effectively prevent it. Against this
background, it is notable that there are almost no really new or construc21
tive proposals for specific provisions to be adopted.
"Pollution" of the seas is a necessary agenda topic for the 1973 Conference on the Law of the Sea. But no one yet knows enough about it to know
what controls are needed and what sacrifices must be accepted; and no one
20

See the Montevideo Declaration, supra note 15.
Much of what is said here in connection with marine pollution is drawn from an
excellent article by Oscar Schacter and Daniel Serwer, Marine Pollution Problems and
Remedies 65 AJIL 84 (January 1971). The Wall Street Journal quotes marine biologists as
telling an Interior Department hearing in New Orleans, that nature returned to normal within
a year after widely publicized oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico and California's Santa Barbara
Channel (Wall Street Journal, September 10, 1971). Mr. Joe Reed, an oceanographer with the
Scripps Institute of Oceanography is quoted by the Associated Press (The Austin American,
September 22, 1971) as saying in an interview, "We're essentially operating in a vacuum as
far as ocean pollution is concerned. Ecologists tell us terrible tales of ocean pollution but they
cannot really justify what they're saying. On the other hand, one can't prove them wrong.
There's always the possibility things are even worse than we think."
21
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has devised an effective system for an even-handed enforcement of those
controls or acceptance of those sacrifices.

The Preparatory Meeting- July-August 1971
As this is written, it is too early to have more than a general impression
of the second preparatory meeting of the Committee in Geneva, in July and
August 1971. The meeting generated seven volumes of papers, and one
doubts that a dozen people have read them all. The meeting had before it
(according to the Secretary-General's "List of Documents") a number of
"working papers," several of which are proposed drafts to establish an
international regime, and thus compete for attention with that submitted by
the United States.
The "working paper" submitted by the United Kingdom is an interesting
contrast both in style and content with that of the United States. As to
machinery, the British draft suggests one international r6gime, no intermediate zone. The regime "might" allocate the underseabed by blocks to
states or groups of states by competitive bidding, with the states free then
to allocate the subleases to their own nationals or to others, but the states
remaining responsible vis- -vis the international agency.
Perhaps the most significant part of the British "working paper" is the
first paragraph, in which it is stated, almost casually, that the regime ought
to be contained in one or more international agreements; and that:
l(b) To assure that the regime will be effective, it should command the
acceptance of the great majority of Member States of the United National
and specialized agencies, including the major maritime nations. The substantive provisions of the agreement, and those for its entry into force, should be
drafted with this aim in mind. [Emphasis supplied]
In a Committee on which 36 states are formally represented, and in a
Conference at which all states will examine its work, decisions are going to
have to be taken by vote rather than by general agreement. The developing
states will have, as they themselves do not hesitate to point out, a decisive
majority of the votes, and can thus draft and adopt one or more treaties to
make up the new law of the sea in any language on which they can agree
The Committee had before it in July-August three reports by the Secretary-General on the special problems the General Assembly had asked him
amongst themselves. It needs to be emphasized, as the British working
paper does, that the "adoption" by the Committee of certain provisions, or
of a "final" draft by any majority is not binding on anybody. It may even
be that some of our own negotiators sometimes tend to forget that fact.
to look into. These reports are a tribute to the expertise and organizing skill
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 6, No. 2
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of the Secretariat, but do little to make easier the task of agreeing on
anything. For example, one of these inquiries was into possible methods
and criteria for sharing the benefits to be produced from undersea areas for
the international agency. After thirty pages of hypothetical examples and
calculations, the Secretary-General concludes:
77. The distributive methods and criteria presented in this report are by nc
means exhaustive of the possible alternatives for distribution of net proceeds
available to the international machinery. Once the international community
decides on the nature of the r6gime and machinery, the delimitation of
the area beyond national jurisdiction, and more information is available on the
technology and economics of deep-sea mining and petroleum exploitation, it
will be necessary to elaborate in greater depth various methods and criteria
for equitable sharing of benefits generated in the area, taking into account the
special needs and interests of the developing countries.
Read that second sentence again. Can anyone imagine an 86-state committee translating it into a specific, workable formula for division of revenues which will command general acceptance?
At the close of the meeting on August 27th, the Committee issued a
press release describing the results of the two meetings, in March and
in July-August 1971, of the Committee and of each of is three subcommittees. 22 This press release, as do press releases generally, tries
hard but in this case unsuccessfully, to point to what has been accomplished. As to the Main Committee, all the release can find to say is that
"the six-week session, the longest so far in the Committee's history, was
almost entirely devoted to the general debate on the issues under its
mandate.. . " and that ".. . during the July-August session informal efforts
continued to be made to resolve the... outstanding issues. . . " In allocating subjects to its Sub-Committees, the Main Committee noted that ". . . it
is clearly understood that the matter of recommendations concerning the
precise definition of the area is to be regarded as a controversial issue on
which the Committee would pronounce... It was hoped, therefore, that an
agreement satisfying those requirements might be achieved by 1973 or
1974 at the latest." [Emphasis supplied]
Sub-Committee 1, according to the press release, held four meetings
during its first session in March 197 1, and twenty-seven meetings during
the second session in July-August. The press release goes on to say that
this Sub-Committee asked the Secretariat to prepare "a comparative table
in which the different written proposals and any additional written proposals. . . submitted by 31 October 1971, would be tabulated." (Poor Secretariat!)
"As of August 1971, "says the press release, "Sub-Committee I completed the first stage in the consideration of the task entrusted to it without
22

U.N. Press Release SB/60, Geneva, August 27, 1971.
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prejudice to the right of delegations to address the Plenary of the
Sub-Committee at any time, on the whole range of issues within its mandate." Proposals and drafts were submitted, and these "will be further
examined at the sessions of the Sub-Committee to be held in 1972, as the
Sub-Committee proceeds to the next stages of its work."
Sub-Committee 11 "concluded the first state of its work, namely the
general debate on the questions referred to it, and started the preparation
of a comprehensive list of subjects and issues relating to the law of the
sea... It was agreed that the work accomplished by the Sub-Committee in
1971, constitutes an indispensable step forward to the completion, at a
later stage, of the tasks entrusted to it."
Sub-Committee III "held a general discussion which took account of
matters relating to the preservation of the marine environment... On the
whole there was general recognition of the grave dangers that marine
pollution presented to the entire marine environment. It was generally
agreed that adequate and effective measures should be taken within the
context of the environment as a whole and that in adopting such measures
due account should be taken of the interests of all States, particularly
coastal States."
All in all, quite a mess. The General Assembly, by letting everybody add
his own particular tin can to the tail of the "law of the sea" to be
"considered as a whole" at the Conference, simply gave too large and
undigested (perhaps indigestible) a tangled mess of problems, to much too
large a Committee. The unwieldy makeup of the Committee has led to too
many speeches and too much polarization of views (in the remarks of
delegates, references to "the group of 77" keep cropping up). The nature of
the problems was such that progress toward a solution of each depended
on progress toward a solution of two or three others that were in the hands
of different people.
At the July-August meeting of the Committee, United States delegates
continued to press for an "accommodation of interests" (this, rather than
the pejorative "compromise," was the "in" phrase). Mr. John Stevenson,
head of the U.S. delegation, urged anybody who would listen, to consider
the concept of an "intermediate zone," whether it be called a "trusteeship
area" or something else. His statements were consistently clear, measured
and made sense; one's heart goes out to him at the obvious lack of
response he got.
Delegates were, by and large, simply talking past each other. No state
can get exactly what it wants on every question; yet none but a few
delegates are yet willing to give up anything of what their instructions call
for them to demand. A Canadian friend, Mr. Beesley, put it well: "We
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must break away from the circular process whereby we cannot consider
limits until the r6gime has been settled, but cannot consider the r6gime
until the limits have been settled. It has been said that one of the advantages of going around in this circle is that we can be sure of never losing
our way. The disadvantage, of course, is that we can be almost equally sure
of never getting anywhere."
What To Do?
It is difficult for this writer not to conclude that the whole effort is
hopelessly bogged down, and should be decently buried while delegates
have still kept their tempers cool.
But that's not enough. The problems are there; what shall we do about
them?
A. What Does the United States Want?
The author's summation would be:
1) A clearly-defined territorial sea, as narrow as possible, and in no
event broader than twelve miles, with protection for navigation and
over-flight of international straits;
2) In general, freedom of the high seas, subject to recognition in some
form of a special interest of coastal states in the control of fisheries in
waters adjacent to their coasts;
3) A clearly-defined continental shelf, as broad as possible (the author's
personal views may be showing through here; but this seems clearly in the
national interest);
4) A clearly-defined r6gime for the seabed outside national jurisdiction,
recognizing the area as "the common heritage of mankind," with predictable and stable operating terms that will attract private risk capital;
5) National control over pollution of the sea by dumping, subject only to
a promise by each state that it will not permit dumping that would "unreasonably degrade or endanger... "
B. What Can the United States Offer to Other States
to Get Agreement on These Things?
We need to keep reminding ourselves that we are not lobbying for a
piece of legislation that can be "enacted" and become binding by a majority vote. 23 We are working for a draft treaty which, to achieve its purpose,
"The General Assembly of the U.N. has on occasion shown signs of beginning to think
of itself as a legislative body. See Onuf, Professor Falk on the Quasi-legislative Competence
of the GeneralAssembly, 64 AJIL 349 (April 1970). In many world crises, this would be a
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must be accepted by enough states to make it worthwhile. In particular, it
must be accepted by those states whose present conduct is contrary to
important norms the treaty would establish, and by those states able to
furnish capital, technology and controls needed to protect the ocean environment and develop its resources on a long-term basis. Let us look at each
of our objectives, and what we can offer in exchange for each, from that
standpoint.
1) On breadth of the territorial sea, all we can offer is to withdraw our
own opposition to a twelve-mile limit. This hardly seems likely to be much
of a bargaining counter. So many states have already claimed twelve miles
without effective opposition, that the right of other states to extend their
claims to that limit now could hardly be contested and would be little
improved by our blessing. Besides, our "Working Paper" has already
proposed twelve miles and this is now regarded as "the United States
24
Position."
2) In discussion, United States negotiators have linked our twelve-mile
proposal with an offer to agree with the 200-milers that if they will clearly
limit their territorial-seaclaims to twelve miles, we will support their claim
to fisheries control to some unspecified broader zone. The language of the
various 200-mile claims is not uniform and in several cases not clear, 25 so
that a suggestion to states that they clarify them is reasonable and, if acted
upon, might answer many objections. But our offer as to control of fisheries
beyond twelve miles, as put forward, is not likely to induce any state to
reduce any broader claim which it has made and is now enforcing.
The core of our proposal, after placing regulatory power in fisheries
organizations to be established, in which any state shall "have an equal
right to participate without discrimination," is a provision that
The percentage of the allowable catch of a stock in any area of the high seas
adjacent to a coastal state that can be harvested by that State shall be
allocated annually to it...26
To this is added a provision that if a coastal state has been unable to
reach agreement on fisheries control with other interested states within a
period of four months, it may put into effect regulations of its own. There is
no definition of what are "adjacent" waters for the purpose of the coastal
state's preferred position.
This writer submits that the new United States proposal is no better than
wholesome role, and it may develop with time. But the General Assembly is not now
competent
either to "repeal" the existing law of the sea, or to "enact" a new body of rules.
24
Dr. F. V. Garcia Amador, Senior Legal Advisor to the Organization of American
States, used just those words in a conference with this writer in November, 197 1.
2F.
V. Garcia Amador, Latin America and the Law of the Sea, supra note 15.
26

August 3, 1971: Dept. of State Bull. LXV, No. 1680: U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/
SC.Il/L.4; X I.L.M. 1013-20.
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the existing 1958 Convention and, in view of the vigor with which claims
to offshore fisheries have been advanced since 1958, is no more likely to
attract any large number of signatory states. The 200-milers have every
reason to feel that their existing unilateral claims give them what they
need; they are under very little pressure to exchange them for new rules to
be agreed which might or might not be equally effective.
3) As to breadth of the continental shelf, the existing legal situation is

fairly clear in words, and the lines are not too difficult to draw on a map.
Under the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, the accepted limits
are "exploitability" and "adjacency"; and the International Court of Justice gives meaning to "adjacency" by referring to the continental shelf as

"the natural prolongation or continuation of the land territory or domain ... into and under the high seas..."

This means that states-including the United States-can now assert,
with some assurance of success, their sole jurisdiction and control, as
"continental shelf," over the submerged area out to the end of the seaward
prolongation of their continental land mass. This. is a concept which is
reasonably free from difficulty, and one's claim rests squarely on the 1958

Convention and on the "ipso jure title which international law attributes to
the coastal State in respect of its continental shelf," to quote the North Sea
27
Cases language.
The United States "Working Paper," presented to the U.N. Seabed
Committee on August 3, 1970, proposes to divide this area into three

zones, as already described. This is obviously a considerable sacrifice of
27

The North Sea Cases, 20 February 1969, 1969 I.C.J. Reports 4 at par. 43, p. 31:
"43. More fundamental than the notion of proximity appears to be the principle-constantly relied upon by all the Parties-of the natural prolongation or continuation of
the land territory or domain, or land sovereignty of the coastal State, into and under the high
seas, via the bed of its territorial sea which is under the full sovereignty of that State... What
confers the ipsojure title which international law attributes to the coastal State in respect of
its continental shelf, is the fact that the submarine areas concerned may be deemed to be
actually part of the territory over which the coastal State already has dominion- in the sense
that, although covered with water, they are a prolognation or continuation of that territory, an
extension of it under the sea..."
A little earlier, in paragraph 41, and in a different connection, the Court had remarked
that
...by no stretch of imagination can a point on the continental shelf situated say a
hundred miles, or even much less, from a given coast, be regarded as 'adjacent' to it, or
to any coast at all, in the normal sense of adjacency... "
Some attempt has been made to make a great deal of this language as a "crucial
qualification" on the later ruling quoted above. But this language is in an earlier part of the
opinion, discussing a different aspect of the case. That the reference to " 100 miles" as being
"beyond any stretch of the imagination" was not intended to enunciate a rule of law is obvious
when one considers that the North Sea itself-the very area involved in these "North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases"-is considerably more than 200 miles wide, and no question is
raised as to the validity of lines of delimitation which lie well over 100 miles from any shore.
See R. Y. Jennings, The Limits of Continental Shelf Jurisdiction, 18 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
819, at pp. 825-6.
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the continental shelf which we-and other states--can now claim. It would
be an especially difficult sacrifice for states which now claim a 200-mile
territorial sea and which, like Brazil, have extensive continental shelves.
This author has listened to numerous explanations, but still does not
understand the reasons underlying this proposal. It would considerably
enlarge the area of international control of the seabed, and thus will be of
worth to us as a bargaining counter only in talks with land-locked states, or
states which have little or no continental shelf, and which must look for
any continental shelf benefits to their share of the revenues according to
the International Authority. If, in the end, the Seabeds Committee votes it
out of the draft (as seems almost certain), 28 any bargains we had made on
the basis of it would be frustrated. If it is included in the final draft treaty, it
will provoke a rash of reservations or refusals to adhere from states with
extensive continental shelves that may well frustrate the entire treaty.
4) A regime for the international seabed. Any lawyer can sit down with
the U.N. Charter in front of him, and draft an organization plan for the
International Seabed Authority to administer development of the resources
on and under the seabed outside the limits of national jurisdiction. Quite a
number of lawyers from different states have done just that,2 9 and harmonizing their drafts into one draft is by no means an insurmountable obstacle. But two considerations need to be borne in mind:
a) These drafts all deal with the Committee's twin mandate to "bear in
mind the special interests and needs of developing countries, whether
coastal or land-locked," by the simple device of saying that the International Authority shall do so.
This is perhaps not objectionable; but all the drafts use the same device
to take care of the equally clear mandate that a system be devised which
will "minimize any adverse economic effects caused by the fluctuation of
prices of raw materials resulting from such activities." On this basis, the
drafts submitted to the Seabed Committee generally give the International
Authority the power to control production and/or fix prices, for substances
produced under licenses which it grants. This power in the hands of the
28For example, at the meeting of the Committee in Geneva on March 17, 1971, the
representative of Kenya said:
"Regarding the trusteeship area proposed by the United States of America, his delegation had stated before the First Committee of the General Assembly and other bodies that it
found the idea unacceptable because it was not consistent with the notion of the common
heritage of mankind ... The creation of another sizeable area of the seabed to be called the
trusteeship area ... would amount to a further annexation of the seabed to the coastal
state.... The Afro-Asian countries should totally reject such a discriminatory concept which
would29ultimately favour only large corporations from developed countries ... "
A number of the draft proposals are reproduced in X I.L.M. at pages 982- 1028
(September 197 1).
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International Agency will considerably reduce the attractiveness of ventures in the seabed area to private risk capital, and require compensatory
advantages in the other terms of licenses which may be offered.
b) Since, as already suggested, draftsmen of an organization for the
proposed international Seabed Authority generally think in terms of the
U.N. Charter, decision-making power is in almost every case entrusted to
a large "Assembly" or a large "Council." And since the "developing"
states have so large a numerical majority, all the proposals except that of
the United States provide for majority decisions on a straight
one-state-one-vote basis. This means that the industrialized states which,
either in their own names or through private contractors under their sponsorship, can provide risk capital and technology to do the exploration and
development of undersea resources, will find themselves at every turn
subject to the voting pleasure of the "mini-states." It will import into
seabed development the polarization that has so far wrecked any hopes for
30
substantive accomplishment by UNCTAD.
An International Seabed Authority with decision-making so organized,
would hardly give the assurance of balanced outlook or stable terms that
the world needs to attract risk capital to its last great frontier. If the world
wants this frontier developed, this is not the way to go about it.
5) The United States proposal in regard to dumping material in the
oceans, is shamefully deficient and would be ineffective. 3' It obligates each
state party to enact legislation prohibiting the transportation from land of
material for dumping in the ocean, except under a general or special permit
issued by that state, and obligates each state party not to issue such
permits for dumping which would "unreasonably degrade or endanger"
health, environment or economic use of the oceans. It does not touch the
question of the pollution of the oceans by accidental-even negligent- causes.

It exempts "discharge of effluent from an outfall structure," and "discharge of matter incident to or derived from the operation of vessels or
aircraft and their equipment." It does not deal with land use or emission of
pollutants which must find their way eventually into the sea. It says
nothing about the major question of pollution of the oceans by the outflow
30

The "Group of 77" (now 95 states out of 131 in the United Nations) met in Lima in
November, 1971, a meeting which was ostensibly and primarily to prepare for the April, 1972
meeting of UNCTAD in Santiago. The final statement of the meeting contained language
about a state's right to use its natural resources, "including those in the waters adjacent to its
coast," as it sees fit.
31
Submitted by the United States to the U.N. Intergovernmental Working Group on
Marine Pollution, meeting in London, JUN 14- 18, 1971. X I.L.M. 1021 (September 1971).
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of polluted rivers or "in any case" internal waters. For example, New
York City could dump its raw sewage into the mouth of the Hudson River,
inside the baseline, and this would be completely outside the purview of
the treaty. Factories could freely discharge mercury, phosphates or any
other pollutant into the territorial sea so long as it was through an "outfall
structure." This writer should not think the United States would take much
pride in such a proposal, or would be disposed to offer much to any other
state to get its agreement to it.
C. On This Summation, What Is the Draft Treaty on
the Law of the Sea (if indeed we get one) Likely to Look Like?

1) Breadth of territorial sea. Twelve miles, with right of innocent passage through international straits, as through any other territorial sea. Any
enlargement of this right will be too complicated and arouse too much
32
opposition, and will be dropped.
There will have to be a provision to the effect that states with a special
economic interest in the conservation and development of fisheries or other
resources in the water adjacent to their coasts, but beyond twelve miles
from shore, may (perhaps after a showing of unsuccessful efforts to reach
agreement with other interested states) enact appropriate regulations and
exercise the necessary control. This will be opposed by distant-water
fishing states, but they are few in number and therefore few in votes,
although reservations on this point by them would mean that the treaty had
failed in one of its prime objectives.
2) Freedom of the High Seas. With a provision such as just outlined for
coastal control of offshore fisheries, a general re-affirmation of freedom of
the high seas will not be a problem. The U.S.S.R. Draft Treaty presented
to the Seabeds Committee on July 22, 1971, contains the same ploy that
embarrassed the United States in the drafting of the nuclear weapons
treaty, that the seabed and the subsoil thereof "shall be open to use
32

The United States proposed articles were spelled out in detail in Draft Articles on the
Breadth of the Territorial Sea, Straits, and Fisheries presented August 3, 1971, supra note
26. In enlarging the territorial sea from three miles to twelve, these articles would change the
"right of innocent passage" through international straits overlapped by territorial waters to
"the same freedom of navigation and overflight, for the purpose of transit through and over
such straits, as they have on the high seas." This considerably enlarged measure of freedom
would apparently apply from baseline to opposing baseline, not just to the newly included
zone beyond the old three-mile limit. It seems likely that many states would agree to give
foreign warships and aircraft the right to transit and overfly their territorial waters so long as
they stay a hundred yards outside their baselines!
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exclusively for peaceful purposes. . .,;3 but they can probably be persuaded to drop it as they did in the weapons treaty, at some cost of face to
US.

3) Breadth of the continental shelf. Each state which has a broad shelf
will vote for a definition that will let it retain that shelf (except the United
States, which is stuck with its "Working Paper"). Landlocked states, or
states with narrow and unpromising shelves, will vote for a narrow shelf,
presumably 200-meter depth, with as much as possible left for the International Area, revenues from which will be divided somehow amongst
everybody. It is impossible to predict what the outcome will be. The
United States "trusteeship area" may even emerge as a dark-horse compromise. It is also impossible to predict how many states will accept a
compromise, and how many will reserve or refuse to sign rather than
curtail the rights which they now have. If the United States formula is
adopted in the draft treaty, we will have to accept it, although it is a
considerable sacrifice. We should certainly accept nothing less.
4) The regime for the seabed beyond national jurisdiction. The "common heritage of mankind" concept is essentially populist in philosophy, to
protect resources for everybody's benefit, before they are grabbed off by
the big boys. We have no quarrel with this philosophy. The r6gime established in the draft treaty will thus reflect the popular majority vote, along
the lines already expressed by developing states. It will have large decision-making bodies, with decisions on a one-state-one-vote basis. Licenses
will be short in term, strict in requirements and subject to modification by
the international organization. To carry out the U.N. Committee's specific
mandates, the organization will have power to control and limit production
and to set prices. Developed states with private risk capital and technology
will be afraid of being accused of "economic imperialism" if they object to
any of this. The result will be an effectual moratorium on seabed development for many years.
5) Pollution control. The United States' proposal is shamefully inadequate. No other specific proposal for inclusion in a treaty on the law of
the sea has come to light as yet. The reason must be that we know
something must be done, but we lack any consensus of scientific knowledge as to what is dangerous enough to require international action now,
and how the necessary choices among evils (endemic malaria vs. DDT
pollution, for example) can be made at an international level. At least, the
3Provisional Draft Articles of a Treaty on the Use of the Sea-Bed for Peaceful Purposes, 22 July 1971, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/43, reproduced in X I.L.M. at p. 994.
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world is awake to the problem and much work is being done to develop the
scientific knowledge, on which intelligent choices can be made and action
taken. Some of this may be available by 1973, but much of it will not.
Conclusion
This sort of discussion can have only two useful purposes:
1) to alert readers to the fact that we are being led into much deeper
waters than we at first expected, and may be backed into corners where we
will have to give up important points with very little benefit to show for
them;34
2) to suggest any action or line of conduct which might as this late date
improve our position.
This observer recommends that the United States take and publicize the
following positions:
"1. Many of the subjects proposed to be dealt with at the 1973 Conference are already settled international law. We do not accept the proposition
that a new state, on recognition and admission to the United Nations, can
choose for itself which rules of international law itwill accept, and which it
will regard as not binding on it. We will willingly discuss possible changes
in the settled rules of international law; but if changes are not agreed, we
are not left with no law; the law stands as it is.
"2. It is settled international law that the permissible breadth of the
territorial sea of states depends upon international law, not upon the
unilateral declaration of each coastal state.3 5 The maximum breadth of
territorial sea so far accepted in international law is twelve miles.
"3. All of the ocean space outside territorial waters is high seas, with its
own rules of international law. Any state has the right and duty to protect
its citizens in the conduct of any lawful activity on the high seas; any
forceful interference by other states with such lawful activity is either
piracy or an act of war.
4

3 Will Rogers once remarked that "we have never lost a war and never won a confer-

ence." There may now be some doubt about the first part of this observation, but the second
part still holds true.
35The Norwegian Fisheries Case, December 18, 1951. 1951 I.C.J. Reports 116. "The
claim of the United Kingdom Government is founded on what it regards as the general
international law applicable to the delimitation of the Norwegian fisheries zone. The Norwegian Government does not deny that there are rules of international law to which the
delimitation must conform..." p. 126.
"The delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect; it cannot be dependent
merely upon the will of the coastal state as expressed in its municipal law. Although it is true
that the act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal state is
competent to undertake it, the validity of the delimitation with regard to other states depends
upon international law." p. 132.
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"4. It is settled international law that every coastal state has sole jurisdiction and control over resources on and under its continental shelf, and
that this continental shelf may extend to the farthest seaward extension of
its continental land mass.3 6 Any restriction of this shelf area must be a
matter for affirmative agreement.
"5. The United States is prepared to use its best efforts to secure the
adhesion of the Soviet Union, Japan and any other distant-water states, to
the 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living
Resources of the High Seas. The United States and Portugal are already
parties. Interested coastal states can easily become parties. The United
States believes that this Convention, if adhered to, offers the best means of
accommodating the interests of coastal states and distant-water fishing
states in conservation of essential fishing resources as a permanent resource for mankind."
"6. The United States is prepared, in agreement with any state or states
which do not agree with the propositions set out in paragraphs 1 through 4
hereof, to work out a formula for submission of any or all of these propositions to the International Court of Justice for binding determination. In the
meantime, our participation in the 1973 Conference on the Law of the Sea
is not to be interpreted as casting any doubt on the continuing validity of
these propositions."
The 1973 Conference, in this writer's opinion, is likely either to fall
apart or to bog down in hopeless haggling over details. This can be
resolved, if at all, only by letting the "Group of 77" write the draft treaty
by their votes. This may well be a treaty which we cannot, in our own
interest, sign. In this not unlikely situation, we would not want the world
left with either the new treaty or no law of the sea at all - a position which
many states would plausibly argue. Let us by all means do our best to bring
off a successful Conference, making trades where we can on a fair basis of
getting something for what we give, but let's also protect our rear.

3

6The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 20 February 1969, quoted supra at note 27.
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